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Abstract 
 
We examine why firms combine convertible debt offerings with stock repurchases. In 
2006, 33% of the convertible issuers in the US simultaneously repurchased stock. These 
combined transactions are inconsistent with traditional motivations for convertible 
issuance. We document that convertible arbitrage drives these stock repurchases. 
Convertible debt arbitrageurs simultaneously buy convertibles and short sell the issuer’s 
common stock, resulting in downward pressure on the stock price. To prevent such short-
selling activity, firms repurchase their stock directly from arbitrageurs. We show that 
combined transactions exhibit lower short-selling activity and that convertible arbitrage 
explains both the size and speed of the stock repurchases. 
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Over the last few years, firms have started to simultaneously repurchase common stock 
when issuing a convertible bond. An example is Equity Office Properties Trust, the 
largest office real estate investment trust in the US, which issued a $1.5 billion 
convertible bond and simultaneously repurchased $622 million of common stock (Wall 
Street Journal, July 5th, 2006). Of all the convertible bond issues in 2006, 33% were 
accompanied by a stock repurchase. On average, these stock repurchases account for 46% 
of the proceeds of the convertible bond issue. Our goal in this paper is to obtain more 
insight on what motivates firms to combine convertible debt offerings with stock 
repurchases. 
The combinations of convertible debt offerings with stock repurchases (“combined 
offerings”) are a puzzle, because they are inconsistent with existing capital structure 
theories. According to Stein’s (1992) backdoor equity rationale for convertible debt 
issuance, firms with large equity-related financing costs use convertible bonds as delayed 
equity financing. In Stein’s framework, firms would not simultaneously repurchase 
equity, since this mitigates their indirect equity issue. Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus 
(1987), and Brennan and Schwartz (1988) in turn argue that firms with high debt-related 
financing costs use convertibles as sweetened debt financing. Combining a convertible 
debt offering with a stock repurchase is also not consistent with these models, because, 
ceteris paribus, repurchasing equity increases firms’ debt ratios and thus enhances the 
potential for debt-related financing problems.  
Our main hypothesis is that the recent surge in combined convertible debt offerings 
and stock repurchases can be explained by the influence of hedge funds. Hedge funds are 
strongly involved in convertible issues: in the US, about 75% of the convertible bonds are 
bought by hedge funds (Arshanapalli et al. (2004), Lian (2006), and Mitchell, Pedersen, 
and Pulvino (2007)). To exploit underpriced convertible issues, hedge funds obtain 
arbitrage positions by buying the convertibles and shorting the common stock of the 
firms that issue convertibles. The increased short selling creates a downward pressure on 
the price of the convertible debt issuer’s common stock (Bechmann (2004), Mitchell, 
Pulvino, and Stafford (2004), and Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld (2007)). Therefore, 
firms might want to mitigate the short-selling activity by repurchasing stock from the 
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hedge funds that buy the convertibles. The sale of the common stock then replaces the 
short positions that arbitrageurs usually obtain.  
The International Finance Review (IFR)’s comments on the specific convertible 
offerings provide several examples of this strategy, e.g.: “United Therapeutics bought 
back 1.8m shares, about 8% of outstanding, for US$112m, […] enabling buyers to pre-
hedge positions through sales of stock back to the company” (October 28 , 2006) th and 
“AmeriCredit repurchased US $254m of its stock on the convertible issue, providing a 
built-in hedge for convertible arbitrage funds” (September 16 , 2006).  th
We combine data from the Securities Data Company (SDC), Compustat, CRSP and 
the NYSE TAQ databases and obtain the following main findings. First, we document 
that the number of shares sold short (relative to trading volume) remains stable for 
convertible issuers that simultaneously repurchase stock, while short-selling activity 
increases from 20% to about 36% for issuers that do not repurchase stock. Second, we 
show that the number of stocks that a firm announces to repurchase strongly correlates 
with the number of shares expected to be shorted with the so-called delta-neutral hedge 
normally setup by convertible debt arbitrageurs (correlation coefficient of 0.88). Third, 
we document that firms engaged in a combined offering repurchase 85.5% (median) of 
the announced number of shares in the first quarter after the announcement. This 
percentage is much higher than the portion of normal (uncombined) stock repurchases 
that are immediately executed (median of 2.5%). The immediate execution of stock 
repurchases is consistent with hedge funds obtaining their arbitrage positions. Fourth, we 
find that in 77% of the cases at least one of the convertible buying institutions already 
owns common stock of the issuing firm. After the issue date of the convertible bonds, 
these stock positions generally decrease. 
Together, these four pieces of evidence suggest that the avoidance of short selling by 
convertible arbitrageurs is indeed an important motivation for combinations of 
convertible bond issues and stock repurchases. In addition to the explanation related to 
convertible debt arbitrage, we examine several alternative reasons for the combination of 
a convertible debt issue with a stock repurchase. We analyze whether a firm engages in 
combined offerings to reduce earnings per share (EPS) dilution, to signal its true value to 
the market, to move closer to its target debt ratio, or to finance a stock repurchase 
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program. We do find some evidence for the signaling motivation, but fail to find evidence 
for the other alternative motivations. We conclude that the avoidance of short selling is 
the main driver behind combinations of convertible debt offerings and stock repurchases.  
Our contributions to the literature are the following. To our knowledge, we are the 
first to empirically test the motivations for firms to combine a convertible debt offering 
with a stock repurchase. Moreover, we contribute to the growing literature on short-
selling activity. Lamont (2004) studies battles between short sellers and firms, and 
describes a variety of methods that firms use to impede short selling, including legal 
threats and lawsuits. We show how expected short selling activity influences firms’ 
financing decisions. Further, we contribute to the literature on stock repurchases. Prior 
studies have shown that stock repurchases tend to be used to signal good prospects 
(Bhattacharya (1979), and Vermaelen (1984)), and to reduce the amount of free cash 
flows at management’s disposal (Jensen (1986)). We add another important motivation 
for repurchasing stock, being the avoidance of short-selling activity.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I provides the theoretical 
background. Section II discusses the data and explanatory variables, and Section III 
shows the empirical results regarding the main hypothesis. Section IV investigates 
alternative explanations, and Section V concludes. 
 
I. Theoretical Background  
 
This section reviews the literature on the motivations for convertible debt offerings 
and stock repurchases, and develops the main hypothesis and testable predictions 
examined in our paper.  
 
A. Motivations for convertible debt offerings 
 
Studies on the motivations for convertible issuance represent two different 
viewpoints. According to Stein’s (1992) delayed equity rationale, companies with high 
equity-related adverse selection costs use convertibles as a substitute for equity. These 
firms subsequently force conversion of the convertible into shares by calling them, and 
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thus obtain equity “through the backdoor”. Other authors argue that convertible debt is 
used as an alternative for straight debt by firms with high debt-related financing costs, 
e.g., asset substitution costs (Green (1984)), adverse selection costs resulting from 
uncertainty about firm risk (Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz 
(1988)), issuance costs related to short term bonds (Mayers (1998)), and overinvestment 
costs related to long-term bonds (Mayers (1998)). 
These traditional explanations for convertible debt cannot explain why, in recent 
years, firms tend to add stock repurchases to their convertible offerings. If a firm uses 
convertibles as an alternative to equity, it would be inconsistent to simultaneously 
repurchase common stock. On the other hand, if a firm uses convertibles to avoid debt-
related financing costs, it would not repurchase equity since this repurchase increases its 
debt ratio.  
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) develop a model that relates convertible issues to 
stock repurchases. They examine which claim a firm should issue when it has private 
information about its own value. They show that the firm can reveal its true value to the 
market by combining a convertible debt offering with a stock repurchase. The intuition is 
that, when issuing a convertible, firms have an incentive to overstate their true value. The 
stock repurchase provides a countervailing incentive. Until now, no paper has tried to 
empirically test the validity of the Constantinides and Grundy model, mainly because 
combined convertible issues and stock repurchases were scarce prior to 2003. One 
testable prediction that can be derived from this model is that combinations of stock 
repurchases and convertible debt offerings should be more favorably received by the 
market than uncombined convertible debt issues. We will test this prediction in Section 
IV.  
 
B. Motivations for stock repurchases 
 
Studies on stock repurchases come in various strands. One strand finds that 
repurchasing stock signals good prospects: payout decisions are explicit signals about 
future earnings, sent intentionally and at some cost by the managers of the firm to their 
stockholders (see, e.g., Bhattacharya (1979) and Vermaelen (1984)). A second strand 
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finds that buybacks reduce the amount of free cash flow at management’s disposal, thus 
mitigating potential overinvestment (Jensen (1986)). Stock repurchases can also decrease 
earnings per share dilution resulting from, for example, stock option plans (Weisbenner 
(2000) and Bens et al. (2003)).  
 
C. Main hypothesis and testable predictions 
 
While previous studies mostly focus on the decision to issue convertibles or on the 
decision to repurchase stock, we examine the motivation for firms to combine these two 
transactions. In informal conversations with CFOs of firms that did the combined 
transaction, we learned that the main incentive is to mitigate the downward pressure of 
short-selling activity on the firm’s stock price. In the US, hedge funds buy about three-
quarters of the issues of convertible bonds (Arshanapalli et al. (2004), Lian (2006), 
Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007)). As convertibles tend to be underpriced 
(Ammann, Kind, and Wilde (2003), Calamos (2003), Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld 
(2007)), these hedge funds generally buy the convertible and go short in common stock 
of the issuing firm to obtain their arbitrage positions.1 Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990), 
Ackert and Athanassakos (2005), and Choi, Getmansky, and Tookes (2007) indeed 
document that firms with convertible debt outstanding report higher monthly short 
interest than other companies. 
                                                 
1 A potential reason for the convertible debt undervaluation is the underestimation of the stock return 
volatility (Calamos (2003)). However, Agarwal, Fung, and Naik (2007) and Batta, Chacko, and Dharan 
(2007) argue that the excess returns from convertible arbitrage strategies are not mainly due to 
underpricing. Instead, the discounts on convertible bond issues represent a compensation for bearing 
liquidity risk, since convertible bonds are relatively illiquid. Of course, it could be questioned why firms 
issue convertibles in the first place, given that these securities are issued at a discount. One possible answer 
to this question is that these firms have both high debt- and equity-related financing costs, so that issuing 
straight debt or equity would be even more harmful to them (see empirical evidence provided by, e.g., 
Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003)). While the motivation for firms to issue convertibles is an interesting 
question, our paper focuses on the motivation for convertible debt issuers to combine their offering with a 
stock repurchase rather than on the convertible debt issuance decision in itself. 
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A number of theoretical studies predict a negative impact of short-selling activity on 
stock prices. Miller (1977) argues that only informed traders with strong negative 
information will be willing to bear the cost of short selling, as short selling is costly. 
Diamond and Verecchia (1987) argue that rational market participants should know that 
high levels of unexpected short sales are bad news, and incorporate this information into 
their trading decisions. Therefore, high levels of short selling should cause stock prices to 
drop. 
The relation between short sales and stock prices has been tested by several papers. 
Senchack and Starks (1993) look at US firms’ reported monthly stock interest in the 
period 1980-1986, and find weak support for the hypothesis that the market reaction to 
increased short interest is negative around the announcement date. Aitken et al. (1998) 
study the effect of short sales on instantaneous price changes by looking at the Australian 
stock market, in which short sales are disclosed immediately. They find that prices react 
negatively. Ackert and Athanassakos (2005) argue that stock prices may also react when 
disclosure is not immediate, as in the U.S. and Canada. In line with their expectations, 
they find negative contemporaneous price effects for Canadian stocks.  
Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990) make a distinction between short selling based on 
private information and arbitrage-related short selling. Arbitrageurs that short sell shares 
of a convertible issuer are not directly trading on adverse information about the firm’s 
stock. Instead, these arbitrageurs seek to exploit the fact that convertibles tend to be 
underpriced. Still, various studies show downward pressures for arbitrage-related short 
selling. Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) study stock price reactions to mergers, and 
find that nearly half of the negative price reaction for the acquirer reflects downward 
price pressure because of arbitrage-induced short selling. Bechmann (2004) examines 
why the announcement of an ‘in-the-money’ convertible bond call is associated with an 
average contemporaneous abnormal stock price decrease of 1.75%. He shows that the 
decrease is due to arbitrage-related short selling. Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld (2007) 
show that short-selling activity by arbitrageurs has a negative impact on the stock price of 
Canadian convertible debt issuers. 
Our main hypothesis is that, to avoid the adverse stock price impact of short selling, 
convertible debt issuers buy back their stock directly from arbitrageurs. That is, 
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convertible debt issuers deliberately select hedge fund arbitrageurs who already own the 
issuer’s common stock, and repurchase stock from these hedge funds to prevent them (or 
alternative buyers that do not own the stock) from engaging in short selling. Firms are 
able to select these buyers since, by law, convertibles combined with stock repurchases 
are always privately placed under Rule 144A.2 Without transaction costs, convertible 
arbitrageurs should be indifferent between short-selling common stock and selling the 
position they currently have, since both result in the same position. However, because 
short selling is costly (D’Avolio, 2002), arbitrageurs prefer to sell their long positions in 
common stock to the convertible debt issuing firm. The firm provides the liquidity for 
these arbitrageurs to sell their stocks. 
From our main hypothesis, we derive four testable predictions. First, we predict that 
short-selling activity will be lower for convertible debt issuers who simultaneously 
repurchase stock than for normal convertible debt issuers. Second, we expect that the 
number of shares a firm announces to repurchase will closely match the expected short 
positions of arbitrageurs. Third, we predict that convertible debt issuers will repurchase 
their stock almost immediately after the repurchase announcement. Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) find that firms on average buy back only 6.3% of the number of stocks 
announced to be repurchased in the first quarter after the announcement. When 
arbitrageurs want to hedge their positions, common stock has to be repurchased at the 
time of issue. We therefore expect the repurchases within the first quarter to be much 
higher than the percentage reported by Stephens and Weisbach. Fourth, we expect to find 
that the institutions that buy the convertible bonds own stock in the issuing firm. We 
predict that these stock positions decrease after the issue date of the convertible bonds, 
since the institutions sell back (part of) their stock positions to the issuing firm.  
                                                 
2 Combinations of convertible issues and stock repurchases have been prohibited under Rule 10b-6 of the 
Securities Act of 1934 (see Lowenfels (1973)). The restrictions of trading during distributions are relaxed 
in Regulation M, which has replaced Rule 10b-6 since December 1996. Regulation M allows the 
combination of convertible issues and stock repurchases for issues under Rule 144A. Rule 144A was issued 
in 1990 to improve the liquidity and efficiency of the private placement market by giving more freedom to 
institutional investors to trade securities. Securities issued under Rule 144A do not require registration with 
the SEC, but can be traded without restriction in the secondary market among qualified institutional buyers 
(i.e., institutions that own over $100 million in assets). 
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 II. Data and Explanatory Variables  
 
In this section, we describe our data and the explanatory variables included in our 
analysis. 
 
A. Samples of convertibles, stock repurchases, and combined offerings 
 
We acquire information on convertible issues and share repurchases in the US for the 
period 1997-2006. We start in 1997, because Regulation M, which made combined 
offerings legal, was introduced late 1996. We obtain issue and repurchase data from the 
Securities Data Company (SDC), company accounts data from Compustat, and stock 
price data from CRSP. We use Factiva to obtain announcement dates. We mark a 
convertible issue as a combined offering if the firm announces (either in SDC or in the 
announcement on Factiva) that it uses the proceeds to repurchase stock, or when both 
transactions are announced separately at the same date.  
Panel A of Table I shows the number of convertible issues, stock repurchases, and 
combined offerings for the period 1997-2006.  
 
[Please insert Table I here] 
 
The number of convertible debt issues fluctuates over time. In the period 1997-2006, 
the convertible issuances peak in 2003 (256 issues), and the low point, 108 issues, occurs 
in 1999. After a decrease of convertible issuances in 2004 and 2005, the number of issues 
increases in 2006. However, over a longer time period, we do not observe a general trend. 
Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) report a sharp decrease in convertible debt offerings 
following the 1987 market crash. In the 1990s, they do not show a strong trend for 
convertible bond issues.  
Table I further shows that the number of stock repurchases has been fairly constant 
since 2000. Before that year, the number of repurchases is substantially higher than it has 
been since then. The number of combined convertible debt issues and stock repurchases 
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has strongly increased over the years. Before 2003, these combined offerings are very 
scarce. In 2003 and 2004 the combined offerings account for about 5% of the total 
number of convertibles. The 13 combined offerings in 2005 comprised 12% of that year’s 
convertible issues. The year 2006 is the most popular year, since 33% of the total number 
of convertible issues are combined with a stock repurchase that year. These findings 
indicate that there is an increasing trend to combine convertible issues with stock 
repurchases, and that this trend is not matched by a strong increase in the overall number 
of repurchases. Given the very low number of combined offerings prior to 2003, we will 
from now on limit our research window to the period 2003-2006.3  
Panel B of Table I shows that the proceeds of the convertible issue are generally 
substantially larger than the funds used to repurchase shares. The average (median) size 
of the stock repurchase represents 43.2% (36.9%) of the proceeds of the convertible 
issue. Still, in five firms the value of the announced repurchase exceeds the proceeds of 
the convertible issue. The minimum percentage of the proceeds used to repurchase 
shares, given that a firm opts for a combined offering, is 5%. On average, the stock 
repurchases represent 7.2% of firms’ market values. 
Panel C of Table I breaks down the sample by the Fama and French 12-industry 
classification. Most convertibles are issued by firms in the business equipment industry 
and the healthcare sector. Firms that engage in combined offerings are spread among 10 
of the 12 industries, although the wholesale and the healthcare sector are slightly 
overrepresented. 
 
B. Short selling data 
 
                                                 
3 The gradual increase in combined offerings suggests that these transactions are a financial 
innovation: since the introduction of Regulation M, the possibility and benefits of using a simultaneous 
convertible issue and stock repurchase have become known to more and more firms. We have checked 
whether particular advisory firms are overrepresented in the sample of firms with combined offerings, 
because these advisors may drive the increase in combined offerings. We did not find a significant 
overrepresentation of any advisory firm in combined offerings, compared to the advisory firms involved in 
uncombined convertible issues.  
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We obtain all short sell flows for firms that issue convertibles in 2005 and 2006 from 
the NYSE TAQ database’s REG SHO file. We start in 2005 as data is only available as of 
January 2005. Thus, in all analyses involving short-selling data, we limit our research 
window to the period 2005-2006. This limitation is not very large since the bulk of 
combined offerings (i.e., 60 out of 85 issues) are made during the years 2005 and 2006. 
We compute the total short sales per firm on a specific day by summing all short sales 
for that firm on that day. We follow Ackert and Athanassakos (2005) by scaling the daily 
number of short sales by the firm’s daily trading volume. We also compute the change in 
short sales, to capture the abnormal part of firms’ short sales:   
 
volumetradingnormal
salesshortnormaldateissuesalesshortsalesshortinchange −= .  (1) 
 
We calculate normal short sales (trading volume) by taking the average short sales 
(trading volume) over the period from ten trading days before the issue date until four 
trading days before the issue date. 
 
C. Control variables 
 
We include the following control variables in the analysis of short-selling activity: 
 
Delta: The delta of a convertible measures the convertible’s sensitivity for small 
stock price changes (Calamos, 2003). The delta can be calculated as:  
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where δ is the continuously compounded dividend yield, T is the maturity of the bond, 
N(.) is the cumulative standard normal probability distribution, S is the price of the 
underlying stock measured one week prior to the announcement date (so that we can 
abstract from the impact that the convertible debt announcement might have on the 
issuing firm’s stock price), X is the conversion price, r is the yield on a 10-year U.S. 
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Treasury Bond, and σ is the stock return variance per annum, estimated as the standard 
deviation of the monthly returns. By construction, the delta is in between zero and one. A 
high delta means that the convertible bond value is sensitive to the common stock value, 
which makes the convertible equity-like in nature. Inversely, a low delta value indicates 
that the convertible is debt-like in nature. Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld (2007) find that 
convertible arbitrageurs prefer convertible bonds with relatively high deltas, as these 
convertibles are more likely to be underpriced. 
Log(assets): The logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. We 
expect that short selling is less expensive for larger firms. 
Liquidity: The logarithm of the average trading volume divided by average shares 
outstanding in the year prior to the offering. Hedge funds prefer liquid stocks as a means 
to quickly establish or close a position (Calamos (2003)). 
Dividend paying: A dummy variable that equals one when the firm has paid a 
dividend in the year preceding the convertible issue, and zero otherwise. Calamos (2003) 
argues that short sellers have a preference for stocks that pay no dividends, since the 
dividend represents a cash outflow for short sellers. 
Stock price run-up: The firm-specific raw return calculated over the 75 trading days 
before the announcement date, as in Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003). The stock price 
run-up serves as a proxy for the perceived overvaluation of the firm by the market. We 
expect a positive relation with short-selling activity, as overvalued stock is more likely to 
be sold short. 
 
We also include control variables for which we have no strong prediction on the 
influence on short sales: 
 
Book leverage:  The long-term book leverage at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Market-to-book ratio: The market price per share of common stock divided by the 
book value per share. 
Proceeds: The total amount of money that is raised by issuing the convertible bonds. 
Private placement: A dummy variable that equals one when the convertible issue is 
privately placed under Rule 144A, and zero otherwise. 
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 III. Do Convertible Issuers Repurchase Stock to Decrease Short-Selling Activity? 
 
Here, we examine the four testable predictions. We also examine whether short 
selling indeed negatively influences stock prices for the convertible debt issuers in our 
sample, which is a crucial assumption underlying our main hypothesis. 
 
A. Short-selling activity for convertible issuers 
 
Table II reports the results of a univariate analysis comparing average short-selling 
activity for convertible issuers that simultaneously repurchase stock to short-selling 
activity of regular convertible debt issuers. Table II also shows whether the size of the 
control variables differs between firms that issue convertibles with and without a 
concurrent stock repurchase. 
  
[Please insert Table II here] 
 
For the total sample, short sales on convertible debt issue dates represent 31.6% of 
trading volume. The issue date ratio of short sales and trading volume is 20.7% for 
convertible debt issuers that simultaneously repurchase stock, and 35.5% for other 
convertible debt issuers. This difference is significant at the 1% level. Our findings are 
similar when we compute the percentage of short sales relative to the number of shares 
outstanding.  
The ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding is not significantly different 
between both subsamples at the issue date. Short-selling activity prior to the convertible 
issue is also similar: both groups have a short ratio of about 20% over the trading days [-
10, -4]. This percentage is relatively similar to findings of Diether, Lee, and Werner 
(2007), who report that short sales represent 24% of share volume for NYSE-listed stocks 
in 2005. 
As expected, firms that issue convertible bonds in combination with a stock 
repurchase are significantly less likely to pay dividends. All combined offerings are 
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privately placed (which is normal given the legal restrictions), while 90% of the regular 
convertible issues in our sample are privately placed. The other control variables are not 
significantly different between the two groups. 
In Table III we test the impact of a concurrent stock repurchase on short-selling 
activity by using an OLS regression analysis, in which we include a dummy variable that 
equals one for combined offerings and zero for other convertible issues. We also include 
the control variables described earlier, as well as industry dummy variables based on the 
Fama-French 12-industry classification. We take the normal level of short-selling activity 
into account by including the variable “normal short selling”, which registers average 
short-selling activity over the trading days [-10, -4].  
 
[Please insert Table III here] 
 
In line with our first prediction, Model 1 shows that, on average, the decision to 
repurchase stock decreases short-selling activity by 14.3 percentage points (significant at 
the 1% level). The R2 of the regression is 56.4%. Model 2 shows that the results are 
similar when we use the change in short sales as the dependent variable. In this model, a 
concurrent stock repurchase decreases the change in short sales on average by 133 
percentage points (significant at the 1% level). 
We find that for the control variables, the equity-likeness (delta) of a convertible and 
the stock price run-up significantly increase short-selling activity, which is in line with 
our expectations. The size of the firm significantly decreases short-selling activity, which 
is not consistent with our prediction. Prior short-selling activity and book leverage have a 
significant positive impact on the issue date short-selling activity, while the market-to-
book ratio has a significant negative impact. We do not find a significant effect for the 
dividend paying dummy variable and for the liquidity of the firm’s stock. 
To check the robustness of our finding that short selling is significantly lower for 
combinations of convertible issues and stock repurchases, we perform the following 
additional analyses. First, we scale short sales by shares outstanding, and find similar 
results. Second, we allow for the possibility that the decision to repurchase stock is 
endogenous. That is, there could be (unobserved) characteristics that influence both 
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firms’ decisions to repurchase stock and that influence expected short sales. We use 
Heckman’s (1979) two-step selection model, and still find a significant positive impact of 
the “combined offering” dummy variable.4 Third, we re-estimate the analysis for short-
selling activity in the period from one day prior to one day after the issue convertible, 
instead of focusing only on the issue date. We find similar results. Fourth, we measure 
normal short selling as the average short-selling activity in the whole year, but this 
change also does not alter our findings. Fifth, we look at the influence of single 
(uncombined) repurchase announcements on short selling. We relate the announcement 
dates of stock repurchases that are not combined with a convertible issue to changes in 
short selling. We find that short-selling activity at repurchase announcement dates does 
not significantly differ from short-selling activity in prior periods. This result indicates 
that the mitigation in short-selling activity is a characteristic of stock repurchases 
combined with convertible offerings, rather than a general feature of stock repurchases.  
 
B. The number of shares announced to be repurchased 
 
Convertible arbitrageurs use the delta as an estimation tool to determine the number 
of shares to short against the long position in the convertible (Calamos (2003)). With a 
so-called delta-neutral hedge, small movements of the stock price do not generate profits 
or losses. We compute the value of the common shares that will be shorted in a delta-
neutral hedge as the product of the number of convertibles issued, the convertible price, 
and the delta. We then determine the number of common shares that are shorted by 
dividing this value by the stock price:   
 
pricestock
deltapriceeconvertiblissuedesconvertiblshortsharescommon **## = . (3) 
                                                 
4 The first step consists of estimating a probit regression with the dependent variable equal to one for 
combined offerings, and equal to zero for uncombined convertible debt issuers, and with the same 
explanatory variables as those included in Table III on the right-hand side. In the second step, we estimate 
the same models as those in Table III, except that we include the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first-
step analysis as an additional explanatory variable.  
 14
 The IFR comments on various convertible bond issues effectively relate the 
simultaneous stock repurchases to the delta of the convertible, e.g.: “Proceeds from the 
offering [of Medimmune] were used […] to repurchase US$150m of stock on the deal; 
[…] the delta hedge is a common application to mitigate the impact of selling” (June 24th, 
2006) and “Generally, when you model a convertible, you allow for some slippage on the 
stock, but by buying back the delta, you are guaranteeing the hedge” (convertible issue of 
Waste Connections, March 18th, 2006). Although some firms repurchase the full delta 
(“The buyback [of Americredit] represents the full delta on the convertible bond”, 
September 16th, 2006), other firms repurchase a portion of the delta (“To mitigate the 
impact on the common stock, Safenet agreed to purchase US$50m of stock, providing a 
delta hedge of 70% of the entire deal”, October 12th, 2005), according to the IFR 
comments.  
If the repurchase behavior is indeed influenced by hedge fund activities for the firms 
in our sample, we expect that the correlation between the number of shares that should be 
repurchased according to the delta-neutral technique and the number of shares the firm 
announces to repurchase is close to one. For 50 of the firms engaging in a combined 
offering, we have all the necessary information to calculate the expected number of 
shares sold short. We find that the correlation coefficient between the common stock 
expected to be shorted and the common stock the firm announces to repurchase is 0.88. 
Firms repurchase fewer shares than we would expect based on the delta-neutral 
technique: the average ratio between shares announced to be repurchased and shares 
predicted to be repurchased is 72.6%. This percentage is close to the percentage of 
convertible bonds generally bought by hedge funds (Arshanapalli et al. (2004), Lian 
(2006), Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007)). Hence, we interpret the findings in this 
section as evidence in favor of an influence of arbitrageurs. 
 
C. The speed with which common stock is repurchased 
 
A third test relates to the speed with which shares are actually repurchased. An 
announcement of a stock repurchase does not precommit firms to acquire a specified 
 15
number of shares. If convertible debt issuers buy back shares to help arbitrageurs obtain 
their arbitrage positions, then we expect the stock repurchases to be executed very 
quickly after their announcement. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) study a sample of 450 
repurchase programs from 1981 to 1990. Employing CRSP data, they find that firms on 
average acquire only 6.3% of the number of stocks announced to be repurchased in the 
same quarter, 46.2% within a year, and 73.9% within three years of the repurchase 
announcement. 
Similar to Stephens and Weisbach (1998), we examine changes in shares outstanding 
obtained from the CRSP database. Among the combined issuers, we have 48 observations 
with sufficient data to determine the changes in shares outstanding for the first quarter. 
We also re-estimate the percentage of shares that is repurchased for normal (uncombined) 
stock repurchases. We have 1,701 observations with sufficient data. We reset 
observations in which the number of shares increases to zero, since we are only interested 
in decreases. Figure 1 shows the actual shares repurchased in normal stock repurchases 
and in combined offerings.  
 
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The dotted line represents the percentage of stock repurchased in uncombined stock 
repurchases. Most firms do not repurchase any stock in the first quarter, and only a small 
percentage repurchases close to 100% of the shares announced to be repurchased. For 
calculating the average percentage of shares to be repurchased, we reset observations in 
which the number of shares repurchased exceeds the announced number to 100%. We 
find that 18.5% of the announced shares are repurchased in the first quarter after the 
announcement for a normal stock repurchase (the median value equals 2.5%). This 
percentage is higher than the 6.3% found by Stephens and Weisbach (1998), indicating 
that firms have increased their actual stock repurchases over time.  
The solid line represents the percentage of stock repurchased in a combined offering. 
A relatively large number of firms (29 firms or 60%) repurchase more than 75% of the 
announced stock repurchase in the first quarter after the announcement. The average 
(median) percentage of shares repurchased is 63.6% (85.5%). Due to potential 
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simultaneous increases in shares outstanding (e.g., due to stock option exercises), the real 
percentages that are repurchased are even higher. Apparently, firms in a combined 
offering repurchase shares much faster than in normal repurchases, which is consistent 
with arbitrageurs obtaining their positions. 
 
D. Stock ownership of the institutions that buy the convertible bonds
 
Firms that issue convertible debt in a private placement often issue a prospectus after 
the initial placement, to allow for re-sales of the convertible bonds to other qualified 
institutional buyers. Typically, this prospectus contains the names of the original buyers 
of the convertible bonds, in the section “Selling Securityholders”. We will employ this 
list of buyers to check whether the buying institutions already own common stock of the 
issuing firm at the time of issue. The stock ownership data are obtained from 13F filings: 
institutions with more than $100 million in assets are obliged by the Securities Exchange 
Act to file a list of their equity holdings on a quarterly basis.  
We collect prospectuses and stock ownership filings from SEC Edgar for all 
combined offerings in the period 2003-2006. We find 52 prospectuses, and select the 
institutions that buy more than 5% of the convertible bonds in the offering. We find 209 
observations for which an institution buys more than 5% of the offered convertible bonds. 
These observations are spread over 90 different institutions, which implies that some 
institutions are involved in multiple deals. In fact, we find that Citadel Equity Fund, 
Highbridge Capital Management, DBAG (Deutsche Bank), and Calamos Asset 
Management are involved in more than ten of the convertible bond offerings. 
We match the 209 observations from the issue prospectuses with institutions that file 
13F reports.5 We delete 28 institutions that we could not match with an institution in 13F 
filings, which leaves 156 observations.  
 
[Please insert Table IV here] 
                                                 
5 Perfect matches are however rare. We recode buying institutions like Calamos Convertible and High 
Income Fund, Calamos Convertible Opportunities and Income Fund, Calamos Global Total Return Fund, 
Calamos High Yield Fund, and Calamos Market Neutral Fund to Calamos Asset Management. 
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 Table IV shows that 77% of the firms that issue convertible bonds in a combined 
offering sell these bonds to at least one institution that already owns their common stock. 
When we focus on this sub-sample of firms, we find that 65% of the buying institutions 
report common stock holdings in the firm. Most of these institutions have owned the 
shares for a longer period: 37% has a stock position more than four years before the 
offering, and 44% has a stock position between one and four years before the offering.  
We expect the common stock holdings to decrease after the convertible debt issue. 
We therefore compare the stock holdings in the quarter after the convertible issue to the 
holdings in the quarter before the convertible issue. Table IV shows that 79% of the 
institutions with a stock position decrease their stock holdings when buying the 
convertible bonds of the firm. These results are in line with the conjecture that 
convertible issuers select institutions with common stock holdings. 
 
E. Downward pressure of short sales on stock prices  
 
All four tests in this section provide evidence that is in line with our hypothesis that 
firms repurchase stock to mitigate short-selling activity. A crucial assumption underlying 
this hypothesis is that short-selling activity effectively has a negative effect on the stock 
price of convertible debt issuers. We will now examine whether this assumption is 
confirmed in our data.  
We measure the cumulative abnormal price effects on the issue date of the convertibles. 
Our observation window is [0, 1], and we estimate the normal stock return over the 
window [-200, -30]. The market return is the CRSP equally-weighted market index. In 
line with Choi, Getmansky, and Tookes (2007), we look at changes in short sales. We 
include the control variables described earlier in our multivariate analysis. We also 
interact the changes in short sales with the liquidity of common stock, because liquidity is 
an important aspect of the influence on stock prices (see, e.g., Cohen, Diether, and 
Malloy (2007), and Choi, Getmansky, and Tookes (2007)). Table V shows the results.  
 
[Please insert Table V here] 
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 In line with our expectation, we find that larger increases of short sales result in 
significantly lower cumulative abnormal returns at the issue date (coefficient is 
significant at the 1% level). The control variables show that a concurrent stock 
repurchase significantly increases abnormal issue date returns. We will return to this 
issue in Section IV. Liquid stocks have significantly higher abnormal returns. 
Interestingly, the downward pressure of short sales on stock prices is higher for more 
liquid stock, as can be seen from the interaction term.  
The fact that repurchasing stock mitigates the short sales might have an effect on our 
results. Therefore, we perform a similar test on only those firms that do not repurchase 
stock. Model 2 shows that the effect of short sales is still negative and significant at the 
5% level. The somewhat smaller effect than in Model 1 could be explained by the fact 
that the firms with the highest expected correlation between short sales and stock prices 
repurchase shares to mitigate these short sales.  
 
IV. Alternative Explanations for Combining Convertible Issues and Stock 
Repurchases 
 
In this section, we examine which other factors induce firms to opt for a combined 
offering. We also discuss the alternative explanation that the firm might use the 
convertible debt offering to finance a stock repurchase. 
 
A. Mitigate earnings per share dilution 
 
Combining convertible issues and stock repurchases mitigates the short-term earnings 
per share dilution that occurs because of the convertible issue. Under the “if-converted” 
method, the denominator of the diluted earnings per share incorporates the shares that can 
be issued upon conversion of the convertible bonds even though these convertibles are 
not (yet) converted into stock. Therefore, a convertible issue without a stock repurchase 
increases the potential number of shares and on a short-term basis decreases firms’ 
 19
reported diluted earnings per share. When stock is repurchased, the number of 
outstanding shares decreases and dilution is mitigated. 
The importance of EPS dilution for convertible issuance is illustrated by the 
popularity of contingent convertibles or COCOs in the period 2000-2004. In this period 
contingent convertibles were not taken into account when calculating diluted earnings per 
share (Marquardt and Wiedman (2005, 2007)).6 After the elimination of the favorable 
treatment of COCOs in 2004, these instruments became much less popular. 
We test the influence of earnings per share dilution on the decision to combine a 
convertible issue with a stock repurchase. To do so, we use a multivariate probit model in 
which the dependent variable is equal to one for convertible debt issuers that add a stock 
repurchase, and equal to zero for other convertible debt issuers. We use the following 
variables that relate to diluted earnings per share (both of which are based on variables in 
Marquardt and Wiedman (2005)):  
 
Change in diluted earnings per share (“decrease EPS”): The change in diluted 
earnings per share that would occur without a stock repurchase. We calculate this change 
as one minus (diluted EPSt-1 adjusted for the convertible issue / diluted EPSt-1), in which 
t-1 refers to the fiscal year-end preceding the announcement. The higher the dilution, the 
larger decrease EPS becomes. 
Bonus: The correlation between the change in the annual CEO cash bonus and the 
change in the diluted EPS by 2-digit SIC code for the year before the offering (only if the 
number of observations for each industry-year is larger than five). We obtain CEO cash 
bonus data from Execucomp. We expect that managers are more concerned with diluted 
earnings per share when their bonus plans relate to this measure, i.e. when Bonus is high.  
 
[Please insert Table VI here] 
 
Table VI reports the results of the probit analysis. The decrease of the diluted 
earnings per share does not play a statistically significant role in the decision to combine 
                                                 
6 COCOs are convertible securities that cannot be converted into shares of common stock until a pre-
specified stock price is reached. 
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a convertible debt issue with a stock repurchase. The relation of the bonus plan of the 
executive officer to the diluted EPS, as captured in the variable Bonus, also does not 
significantly influence firms’ decisions to use a combined offering. Hence, we do not find 
that the avoidance of EPS dilution is an important motivation in the decision to combine 
a convertible debt issue with a stock repurchase. The results are robust to excluding the 
five observations in which the stock repurchase is larger in size than the convertible 
issue. With the exception of the stock return volatility (which is significantly smaller for 
firms engaging in combined offerings), the control variables are not significant.  
 
B. Signal firm value 
 
Although we have already tested stock price effects on the issue date, we also expect 
to find an impact of concurrent stock repurchases on the announcement dates of 
convertible issues. A convertible issue announcement generally has a significantly 
negative stock price effect (see, e.g., Davidson, Glascock, and Schwartz (1995), Lewis, 
Rogalski, and Seward (2003), and Marquardt and Wiedman (2005)). This result is 
consistent with Myers (1984), who argues that equity(-linked) offerings might signal firm 
overvaluation.  
By contrast, various studies argue that repurchasing stock signals good prospects for 
the firm (see, e.g., Bhattacharya (1979), Vermaelen (1984)). Most empirical studies 
effectively find significantly positive abnormal returns at stock repurchase 
announcements (see, e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995)).  
Based on the model of Constantinides and Grundy (1989), we predict that convertible 
debt issuers might add a stock repurchase to signal to the market that they are not 
overvalued. Hence, this model implies that the stock price reaction at announcements of 
combined offerings should be more favorable than the stock price reaction at 
announcements of uncombined convertible issues.  
To test this prediction, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement 
date of convertible issues and stock repurchases. We obtain the announcement dates from 
the Factiva database. For most private placements, the announcement date is either the 
issue date or one day prior to the issue date. Our primary observation window is [-1, 0], 
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and we estimate the normal return over the window [-200, -30]. The market return is the 
CRSP equally-weighted market index. The results are presented in Panel A of Table VII. 
 
[Please insert Table VII here] 
 
In line with the literature, we find that uncombined convertible offerings induce a 
significantly negative abnormal stock return of -4.09%, and that uncombined stock 
repurchases induce a significantly positive stock price effect of 0.60%. The abnormal 
return at combined offerings is not significantly different from zero. We thus obtain 
evidence that combinations of a convertible debt offering and a stock repurchase are 
indeed more favorably received by the market than single convertible debt offerings (t-
statistic for difference in means equals 5.58).  
An interesting question is whether the combining issuers realize a synergy effect by 
simultaneously announcing the two transactions. That is, is the abnormal return at 
combined announcements of convertible debt offerings and stock repurchases 
significantly different from the sum of the abnormal returns that these same firms would 
have realized if they would have announced the two transactions at two different points in 
time?  
To examine this question, we use the samples of uncombined convertible bond issues 
and uncombined stock repurchases to estimate the effects of various characteristics on the 
announcement effects of convertible debt issues and stock repurchases. Model 1 of Panel 
B shows the effects of various firm and bond characteristics on the cumulative 
announcement window returns of uncombined convertible debt issues. In line with 
Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1999), we find that convertibles with a larger delta induce 
significantly lower abnormal returns. Also consistent with prior studies, we find that 
larger firms and firms with higher market-to-book ratios have on average higher 
convertible debt announcement returns. Model 2 shows the effects of various firm and 
repurchase characteristics on the abnormal returns at stock repurchase announcements. 
The abnormal returns are significantly higher for smaller firms and firms with lower 
leverage, and significantly lower for firms with high market-to-book ratios and higher 
stock price run-ups. 
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We subsequently use the resulting regression coefficients to calculate expected 
abnormal returns for combined issuers had they issued an uncombined convertible 
instead, and had they announced an uncombined stock repurchase instead. In Panel C of 
Table VII, we present the results of this counterfactual analysis. We find that, had the 
combined issuers announced an uncombined convertible debt offering instead, the 
announcement effect would have been -3.48% on average. Had these firms only 
announced a stock repurchase, the announcement effect would have been 1.16%.  
We sum these two expected abnormal returns for a comparison with the observed 
joint announcement effect. The difference between the joint announcement effect (-
0.58%) and the expected sum of separate effects (-2.32%) is significant at the 5% level (t-
statistic for difference in means equals 2.17). Hence, combined issuers seem to realize 
more favorable announcement effects by combining the announcements of convertible 
debt issues and stock repurchases. 
 
C. Optimize capital structure 
 
The decision to add a stock repurchase to a convertible issue could be due to the fact 
that firms want to move towards their optimal debt ratios. Repurchasing stock increases 
firms’ debt ratios, which could bring them closer to their optimal debt ratios if they were 
previously underlevered. A prediction of this reasoning would be that, ceteris paribus, 
firms that combine their convertible issue with a stock repurchase have significantly 
lower leverage ratios and/or higher debt targets. However, Table VI shows that the 
impact of leverage on the decision to repurchase stock is not significant, and Table I 
shows that convertible issuers are from similar industries, irrespective of their decision to 
simultaneously repurchase stock.  
To further examine the possibility that the combined offerings are motivated by the 
wish to reach a target debt ratio, we extend the probit analysis reported in Table VI with 
two variables. The first variable captures the difference between firms’ leverage and the 
industry median leverage, in which the industries are based on the Fama-French 12 
industries classification. The second variable is the marginal tax rate of firms (before 
interest expenses), which can be downloaded from John Graham’s website. Graham 
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(1999) uses these marginal tax rates to show that firms with higher marginal tax rates 
have significantly higher leverage: interest deductibility encourages higher debt ratios. 
We find that none of these two variables is significant (detailed results are not reported 
for parsimony). We therefore conclude that the adjustment of firms’ leverage towards a 
target debt ratio does probably not drive the decision to combine a convertible debt 
offering with a stock repurchase. 
  
D. Combined offerings from the perspective of stock repurchasers 
 
Throughout the paper, we have assumed that firms that engage in a combined offering 
add a stock repurchase to a convertible issue. One argument for this reasoning is that on 
average, the convertible issue is about twice the size of the stock repurchase. However, 
the possibility exists that the initial decision is to repurchase stock, and that the 
convertible issue is added simply to obtain funds for the repurchase. Therefore, we 
examine the differences between pure stock repurchasers and firms that combine stock 
repurchases with convertible issues.  
If the main motivation for the combined offerings is to repurchase stock, we predict 
that firms engaging in combined offerings have less slack than normal stock repurchasers 
– otherwise, the former firms would not have to issue convertibles in order to obtain the 
necessary funding. We do not find significant differences in the amount of slack (cash 
and short-term investments as a percentage of total assets) between firms in combined 
offerings and uncombined stock repurchasers (t-test statistic for difference in means 
equals -0.32). Also, we have checked whether firms engaging in a combined offering are 
the firms that regularly announce stock repurchases and are therefore expected to do so 
again. We find that, for the combined issuers, the number of announced stock repurchases 
over the five years preceding the convertible debt announcement does not significantly 
differ from normal stock repurchasers or from normal convertible issuers.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 24
In this study, we examine the motivations for U.S. firms to add a stock repurchase to 
a convertible debt offering. The main focus is thus not on the motivations to issue 
convertible debt, which are investigated in for example Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward 
(2003). Instead, we focus on the way in which recent convertible issues are structured, 
like for example Korkeamaki and Moore (2004), who examine call provisions in 
convertible bonds.  
We argue that the combination of convertible debt offerings and stock repurchases is 
linked with convertible arbitrage: convertible arbitrageurs generally short the firms’ 
common stock, which for firms is an undesired side effect, as short selling creates a 
downward pressure on the stock price. The stock repurchase serves to avoid short-selling 
activity.  
We obtain strong evidence consistent with this hypothesis. First, the announced stock 
repurchase lowers short-selling activity at the issue date. Second, the number of shares 
that a firm announces to repurchase correlates strongly with the expected short positions 
of convertible arbitrageurs. Third, the speed with which stock is repurchased is 
substantially higher in the combined transactions than in pure stock repurchases, which is 
consistent with arbitrage activity. Fourth, the majority of firms sell convertible bonds to 
at least one institution that holds their common stock. Combined, this evidence indicates 
that convertible arbitrage provides an important reason for convertible debt issuers to 
repurchase stock. We also show that the stock market reacts significantly more positive to 
convertibles combined with a stock repurchase than to uncombined convertible offerings.  
Our study provides various contributions to the literature. We contribute to the 
literature on convertible bonds by describing a recent characteristic of convertible issues. 
We further contribute to the literature on stock repurchases by adding an important 
motivation for repurchasing stock, being the avoidance of short-selling activity. We also 
contribute to the growing literature on short-selling activity. More specifically, our paper 
shows that expected short selling activity influences firms’ financing decisions. 
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Figure 1. Percentages of actual repurchases in the first quarter after the announcement of a stock 
repurchase. This figure shows which percentage of an announced stock repurchase is actually repurchased 
within the first three months after the announcement. The sample period is 2003-2006. The solid line 
represents stock repurchases that are announced in combination with convertible bond issues. The dotted 
line represents stock repurchases that are announced without a simultaneous convertible bond issue.
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Table I 
Dispersion of Issues and Repurchases over Time, Value of the Transactions, and Industrial 
Dispersion. 
 
This table presents summary statistics. The sample period in Panel A is 1997-2006, the sample period in 
Panels B and C is 2003-2006. Panel A reports the number of convertible issues, stock repurchases, and 
combined offerings of convertible issues and stock repurchases per year. We label a convertible issue as a 
combined offering when the firm announces (either in SDC or Factiva) to use part of the proceeds of the 
convertible debt offering to repurchase stock, or when both transactions are announced on the same date. 
Panel B compares the proceeds of the convertible issue with the size of the announced stock repurchase. 
The proceeds of the convertible issue are obtained from SDC; the size of the stock repurchase is obtained 
from SDC or from the repurchase announcement. We also compare the announced size of the repurchase to 
the firms’ market values. We calculate a firm’s market value by multiplying Compustat Item 25 with Item 
199. In Panel C, we show the distribution of convertible issues over the Fama-French 12 industries 
classification. 
Panel A: Dispersion over time 
Year  Number of 
convertibles issued 
 Number of 
repurchases 
announced 
 Number of 
combined 
offerings 
 Percentage 
combined offerings 
of total convertible 
issues 
1997  237  1,286  0  0% 
1998  145  1,934  0  0% 
1999  108  1,515  0  0% 
2000  153  806  1  1% 
2001  207  659  3  1% 
2002  117  469  2  2% 
2003  256  470  10  4% 
2004  181  563  9  5% 
2005  113  638  13  12% 
2006  142  586  47  33% 
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Panel B: Value of the announced stock repurchases compared to the proceeds of the convertible 
issue and firms’ market values 
  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
deviation 
Value repurchase / 
proceeds convertible 
issue 
 0.432  0.369  0.050  1.111  0.276 
Value repurchase / market 
value 
 0.072  0.054  0.004  0.489  0.070 
Panel C: Industry classification  
Fama-French 12-
industry classification 
 Firms that issue a convertible 
and repurchase shares 
 Firms that issue a convertible without 
repurchasing shares 
  N  %  N  % 
Consumer nondurables  1  1%  6  1% 
Consumer durables  2  3%  7  1% 
Manufacturing  4  5%  40  7% 
Energy  0  0%  31  6% 
Chemicals  0  0%  8  1% 
Business equipment  15  20%  122  22% 
Telephone  1  1%  25  5% 
Utility  1  1%  20  4% 
Wholesale  9  12%  42  8% 
Healthcare  16  21%  96  17% 
Financial  13  17%  84  15% 
Other  13  17%  69  13% 
Total  75  100%  550  100% 
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 Table II.  
Univariate Analysis of the Differences between Issuers of Combined and Uncombined Convertibles 
 
This table presents the results of univariate tests on the impact of adding a stock repurchase to a convertible 
issue. The sample period is 2005-2006, and we only include convertible issuers for which we have short 
sell data available. We label a convertible issue as a combined offering when the firm announces (either in 
SDC or Factiva) to use part of the proceeds of the convertible debt offering to repurchase stock, or when 
both transactions are announced on the same date. Short sales at the issue date are the sum of all short sales 
for that specific firm that day, as reported in the NYSE TAQ database’s REG SHO file. We compute the 
change in short sales by dividing the difference between short sales at the issue date and short sales over the 
period [-10 trading days; -4 trading days] by the trading volume over the period [-10 trading days; -4 
trading days]. Daily trading volume and the number of shares outstanding are from CRSP. Delta is the 
convertible’s sensitivity for small stock price changes. Eq. 2 shows the formula for computing delta. Total 
assets correspond to Compustat Item 6 and are reported in millions of dollars. Stock liquidity is the average 
trading volume divided by the average shares outstanding in the year prior to the offering. Dividend paying 
is a dummy variable registering whether a firm paid a dividend in the year prior to the offering, which can 
be established with Compustat Item 21. The stock price run-up is the firm-specific raw return over a period 
of 75 trading days before the announcement date, and is computed with CRSP Item RETX. Book leverage 
is Compustat Item 9 divided by Item 6. The market-to-book ratio is computed as (Item 25 * Item 199 – 
Item 60 – Item 6) / Item 6. Proceeds represent the total amount of money raised by the convertible issue in 
millions of dollars, as reported in SDC. Private placement is a dummy variable that is one when the bond is 
privately placed (as indicated in SDC), and zero otherwise. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance level, respectively.  
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  Total convertible 
debt sample 
Combined 
offerings 
 Uncombined  
offerings 
 Difference 
of means t-
statistics 
 N Mean  N Mean  N  Mean   
Short sales / trading volume at 
issue date 
112 0.316  29 0.207  83 0.355  -5.000*** 
Change in short sales 112 1.329  29 0.227  83 1.714  -5.330*** 
Short sales / shares outstanding 
at issue date  
112 0.012  29 0.007  83 0.013  -3.011*** 
Trading volume / shares 
outstanding at issue date 
112 0.036  29 0.039  83 0.035  0.500 
Normal short sales / trading 
volume 
112 0.199  29 0.198  83 0.199  -0.060 
Delta 78 0.893  25 0.874  53 0.902  -0.569 
Total assets 112 33,706  29 17,565  83 39,345  -1.078 
Stock liquidity 112 0.010  29 0.010  83 0.010  0.013 
Dividend paying 110 0.527  28 0.393  82 0.573  -1.656* 
Stock price run-up 112 0.001  29 0.001  83 0.001  0.990 
Book leverage 112 0.495  29 0.494  83 0.496  -0.023 
Market-to-book ratio 112 1.633  29 1.660  83 1.623  0.193 
Proceeds 112 395  29 480  83 366  1.074 
Private placement 110 0.927  29 1  81 0.901  2.961*** 
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 Table III. 
Impact of Combining a Convertible Bond with a Stock Repurchase on Short Selling Activity around 
the Issue Date  
 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression analysis on the impact of adding a stock repurchase to a 
convertible issue on short-selling activity. The sample period is 2005-2006. Short sales at the issue date are 
the sum of all short sales for that specific firm that day, as reported in the NYSE TAQ database’s REG 
SHO file. We compute the change in short sales by dividing the difference between short sales at the issue 
date and short sales over the period [-10 trading days; -4 trading days] by the trading volume over the 
period [-10 trading days; -4 trading days]. Daily trading volume is obtained from CRSP. Combined offering 
is equal to one for combined offerings, and zero otherwise. We label a convertible issue as a combined 
offering when the firm announces (either in SDC or Factiva) to use part of the proceeds of the convertible 
debt offering to repurchase stock, or when both transactions are announced on the same date.  Delta is the 
convertible’s sensitivity for small stock price changes. Eq. 2 shows the formula for computing delta. 
Log(assets) corresponds to the natural logarithm of Compustat Item 6. Stock liquidity is the average trading 
volume divided by the average shares outstanding in the year prior to the offering. We take the natural 
logarithm for stock liquidity. Dividend paying is a dummy variable registering whether a firm paid a 
dividend in the year prior to the offering, which can be established with Compustat Item 21. The stock price 
run-up is the firm-specific raw return over a period of 75 trading days before the announcement date, and is 
computed with CRSP Item RETX. Book leverage is Compustat Item 9 divided by Item 6. The market-to-
book ratio is computed as (Item 25 * Item 199 – Item 60 – Item 6) / Item 6. Log(proceeds) represents the 
natural logarithm of the total amount of money raised by the convertible issue. Normal short selling is a 
firm’s daily short sales over the period [-10 trading days; -4 trading days] divided by the trading volume 
over the period [-10 trading days; -4 trading days]. Industries are based on the Fama-French 12 industries 
classification. We report t-statistics calculated with Huber-White standard errors, to control for 
heteroscedasticity. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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    Short sales at issue 
date / trading volume 
at issue date 
 Change in short sales 
   (1)  (2) 
Combined offering   -0.143*** 
(-4.371) 
 -1.333*** 
(-2.708) 
Delta   0.173** 
(2.521) 
 3.242*** 
(3.674) 
Log(assets)   -0.125*** 
(-3.744) 
 -1.703*** 
(-2.696) 
Stock liquidity   -0.055 
(-1.223) 
 -1.275 
(-1.477) 
Dividend paying   -0.009 
(-0.272) 
 -0.674 
(-1.040) 
Stock price run-up   12.398** 
(2.081) 
 150.913 
(1.384) 
Book leverage   0.146** 
(2.030) 
 2.392 
(1.227) 
Market-to-book ratio   -0.031* 
(-1.829) 
 -0.610** 
(-2.130) 
Log(proceeds)   0.036 
(1.446) 
 0.764 
(1.654) 
Normal short selling   0.551** 
(2.171) 
  
Industry dummies   Yes  Yes 
N   76  76 
R2   56.4%  30.7% 
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Table IV 
Stock Ownership of Buying Institutions 
 
This table presents the stock ownership of the institutions that buy the convertible bonds of combined 
offerings. The sample period is 2003-2006. We label a convertible issue as a combined offering when the 
firm announces (either in SDC or Factiva) to use part of the proceeds of the convertible debt offering to 
repurchase stock, or when both transactions are announced on the same date. We obtain the buying 
institutions from the convertible debt prospectuses. Institutional ownership is obtained from the 13F filings 
in SEC Edgar. We only select institutions that buy more than 5% of the convertible bonds being offered. 
The sample for the first analysis consists of 53 firms that engage in a combined offering. The sample for the 
second analysis consists of 129 institutions that buy convertible bonds from firms in which at least one 
institution holds a stock position. The sample in the third and fourth analysis consists of 84 institutions that 
buy convertible bonds from a firm in which they have a stock position.      
  N  % 
Firms engaged in combined offerings     
At least one of the buying institutions owns common stock  41  77% 
None of the buying institutions owns common stock  12  23%
  53  100% 
At least one of the buying institutions owns common stock     
Buying institutions owning common stock  84  65% 
Buying institutions owning no common stock  45  35%
  129  100% 
Buying institutions owning common stock: holding period     
Position less than a year  16  19% 
Position between 1 and 2 years  7  8% 
Position between 2 and 3 years  20  24% 
Position between 3 and 4 years  10  12% 
Position more than 4 years  31  37%
  84  100% 
Buying institutions owning common stock: changes in stock holdings     
Decrease in stock holdings after convertible issue  66  79% 
Stock holdings constant after convertible issue  2  2% 
Increase in stock holdings after convertible issue  16  19%
  84  100% 
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Table V 
Stock Price Effect of Short Sales 
 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of the impact of short-selling activity on 
cumulative abnormal returns of convertible debt issuers at the issue date. The sample period is 2005-2006. 
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return measured over the window [0, 1] relative to the 
issue date. In Model 1 we include all convertible issuers for which we have data on short sales. Model 2 
solely focuses on firms that issue a convertible bond without repurchasing stock. We compute the change in 
short sales by dividing the difference between the short sales at the issue date and short sales over the 
period [-10 trading days; -4 trading days] by the trading volume over the period [-10 trading days; -4 
trading days]. Combined offering is equal to one for combined offerings, and zero otherwise. We label a 
convertible issue as a combined offering when the firm announces (either in SDC or Factiva) to use part of 
the proceeds of the convertible debt offering to repurchase stock, or when both transactions are announced 
on the same date. Delta is the convertible’s sensitivity for small stock price changes. Eq. 2 shows the 
formula for computing delta. Log(assets) corresponds to the natural logarithm of Compustat Item 6. Stock 
liquidity is the average trading volume divided by the average shares outstanding in the year prior to the 
offering. We take the natural logarithm for stock liquidity. Dividend yield is Compustat Item 21 divided by 
the market value, calculated as Item 25 * Item 199. The stock price run-up is the firm-specific raw return 
over a period of 75 trading days before the announcement date, and is computed with CRSP Item RETX. 
Book leverage is Compustat Item 9 divided by Item 6. The market-to-book ratio is computed as (Item 25 * 
Item 199 – Item 60 – Item 6) / Item 6. Log(proceeds) represents the natural logarithm of the total amount of 
money raised by the convertible issue. Industries are based on the Fama-French 12 industries classification. 
We report t-statistics based on Huber-White standard errors, to control for heteroscedasticity. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.  
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 Cumulative abnormal returns 
 (1)  (2) 
Change in short sales -0.177*** 
(-2.664) 
 -0.160** 
(-2.423) 
Combined offering 0.037** 
(2.560) 
  
Delta -0.039 
(-1.500) 
 -0.033 
(-1.104) 
Log(assets) 0.035 
(1.384) 
 0.047 
(1.533) 
Stock liquidity 0.036* 
(1.914) 
 0.041 
(1.623) 
Dividend yield firm -0.139 
(-0.594) 
 0.125 
(0.714) 
Stock price run-up. 1.253 
(0.345) 
 6.126 
(1.629) 
Book leverage 0.019 
(0.647) 
 0.050 
(1.265) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.002 
(0.286) 
 0.005 
(0.623) 
Log(proceeds) -0.011 
(-0.815) 
 -0.015 
(-0.877) 
Change in short sales * Stock liquidity -0.036*** 
(-2.752) 
 -0.033** 
(-2.531) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
N 74  50 
R2 42.3%  48.7% 
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Table VI 
Impact of Firm and Bond Characteristics on the Decision to Combine a Convertible Issue with a 
Stock Repurchase 
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of a probit model. The sample period is 2003-2006. The 
dependent variable is a dummy that equals one for combined offerings and zero for uncombined offerings. 
We label a convertible issue as a combined offering when the firm announces (either in SDC or Factiva) to 
use part of the proceeds of the convertible debt offering to repurchase stock, or when both transactions are 
announced on the same date. Decrease EPS is the change in diluted earnings per share that would occur 
without a stock repurchase. Bonus is the correlation between the change in annual CEO cash bonus 
(reported in Execucomp) and the change in diluted EPS by 2-digit SIC code for the year before the 
offering. Both Decrease EPS and Bonus are calculated as in Marquardt and Wiedman (2005). Delta is the 
convertible’s sensitivity for small stock price changes. Eq. 2 shows the formula for computing delta. 
Log(assets) corresponds to the natural logarithm of Compustat Item 6. The stock price run-up is the firm-
specific raw return over a period of 75 trading days before the announcement date, and is computed with 
CRSP Item RETX. Book leverage is Compustat Item 9 divided by Item 6. The market-to-book ratio is 
computed with Compustat data as (Item 25 * Item 199 – Item 60 – Item 6) / Item 6. Volatility is the stock 
return variance in the year prior to the offering, estimated as the standard deviation of the monthly returns 
(reported in CRSP). Industries are based on the Fama-French 12 industries classification. t-statistics appear 
in parentheses and are calculated using Huber-White standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.  
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  Combined offering  
Decrease EPS  2.236 
(1.305) 
  
Bonus  -0.385 
(-0.902) 
Delta  -0.328 
(-0.751) 
Log (assets)  -0.028 
(-0.192) 
Stock price run-up  -26.383 
(-0.867) 
Book leverage  -0.034 
(-0.120) 
Market-to-book ratio  0.099 
(1.593) 
Volatility  -3.063* 
(-1.956) 
Industry dummies  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes 
N  425 
Pseudo R2  23.1% 
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Table VII: 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns at the Announcement date 
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of the cumulative abnormal returns. The sample period is 
2003-2006. Panel A reports the observed cumulative abnormal returns. The estimation window for 
determining the abnormal returns is [-1, 0]; with day zero representing the announcement date. For the 
observed CARs, Patell Z statistics are reported in parentheses. For the difference of means test we report t-
statistics in parentheses. Panel B shows the results of OLS regression analyses examining the effects of 
various characteristics on the announcement effects of uncombined convertible debt issues (Model 1) and 
uncombined stock repurchases (Model 2). We exclude combined offerings from the sample in Panel B (we 
label a convertible issue as a combined offering when the firm announces (either in SDC or Factiva) to use 
part of the proceeds of the convertible debt offering to repurchase stock, or when both transactions are 
announced on the same date). Delta is the convertible’s sensitivity to small stock price changes. Eq. 2 
shows the formula for computing delta. Log(assets) corresponds to the natural logarithm of Compustat Item 
6. Stock liquidity is the average trading volume divided by the average shares outstanding in the year prior 
to the offering. We take the natural logarithm for stock liquidity. Dividend yield is Compustat Item 21 
divided by the market value, calculated as Item 25 * Item 199. The stock price run-up is the firm-specific 
raw return over a period of 75 trading days before the announcement date, and is computed with CRSP 
Item RETX. Book leverage is Compustat Item 9 divided by Item 6. The market-to-book ratio is computed 
as (Item 25 * Item 199 – Item 60 – Item 6) / Item 6. Log(proceeds) in Model 1 represents the natural 
logarithm of the total amount of money raised by the convertible issue. Log(proceeds) in Model 2 is the 
natural logarithm of the size of the announced repurchase. Industries are based on the Fama-French 12 
industries classification. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are calculated with Huber-White standard 
errors to control for heteroscedasticity. Panel C reports the expected cumulative abnormal returns for firms 
in combined offerings if they had announced the offerings separately. The estimations of the expected 
cumulative abnormal returns are based on the regression outcomes in Panel B. For the difference of means 
test we report t-statistics, which appear in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% significance level, respectively.  
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 Panel A: Observed cumulative abnormal returns  
 
 
 N 
(1) 
 Average 
(2) 
 Median 
(3) 
Observed CARs       
Combined offerings  54  -0.58% 
(-0.201) 
 -0.34% 
Uncombined convertible issues  413  -4.09%*** 
(-24.419) 
 -3.82% 
Uncombined stock repurchases  1,610  0.60%*** 
(9.108) 
 0.31% 
       
Difference of means       
Observed CAR at combined offering versus 
observed CAR at uncombined convertible issue 
   3.51%*** 
(5.584) 
  
Observed CAR at combined offering versus 
observed CAR at uncombined stock repurchase 
   -1.18*** 
(3.368) 
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Panel B: Impact of various characteristics on cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement 
date of uncombined convertible issues and stock repurchases 
  Cumulative abnormal returns 
  Uncombined convertible issue Uncombined stock repurchase 
     (1)  (2) 
Delta   -0.033** 
(-2.327) 
  
Log(assets)  0.020** 
(2.058) 
 -0.002** 
(-2.180) 
Stock liquidity  0.005 
(0.942) 
 -0.001 
(-0.995) 
Dividend yield  -0.078 
(-0.701) 
 0.014 
(0.289) 
Stock price run-up  0.114 
(0.135) 
 -0.853* 
(-1.827) 
Book leverage  -0.013 
(-1.261) 
 -0.007* 
(-1.797) 
Market-to-book ratio  0.010*** 
(3.335) 
 -0.004*** 
(-3.895) 
Log(proceeds)  0.006 
(0.938) 
 0.001 
(0.998) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
N  413  1,610 
R2  13.9%  4.3% 
Panel C: Expected cumulative abnormal returns 
 
 
 N 
(1) 
 Average 
(2) 
 Median 
(3) 
Expected CARs for firms that combine offerings…       
if they had done a uncombined convertible issue instead  54  -3.48%  -3.73% 
if they had done a uncombined stock repurchase instead  54  1.16%  1.40% 
Sum   54  -2.32%  -2.43% 
       
Difference of means
Observed CAR at combined offering versus sum of 
expected CARs 
   1.74%** 
(2.165) 
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